

MR Review Essay

The Embeds' War

Lieutenant Colonel Scott Stephenson, U.S. Army, Retired

In a 3-week period during the spring of 2003, a U.S.-led coalition won an impressive victory over the badly overmatched forces of Saddam Hussein. During that same period, the U.S. military seemed to have won a victory over its fear of the media. This collateral triumph was due to the hundreds of embedded reporters who accompanied the invasion into Iraq and who brought instantaneous and near-instantaneous print and video coverage of the blitzkrieg to Baghdad.

The spin imparted to the story by these reporters was overwhelmingly positive. Soldiers and media representatives seemed to bond in the shared privation and danger of the operation, and, while some critics complained about the dangers of lost impartiality, U.S. military leaders judged the embed experiment an overwhelming success.

The embedded reporters brought a variety of credentials to the war, but two of the best qualified were David Zucchino of the *Los Angeles Times* and Rick Atkinson of the *Washington Post*. Zucchino was awarded a Pulitzer Prize for journalism in 1989 and has shared a pair of Overseas Press Club awards for his coverage of the War on Terrorism. Significant among his other achievements is the editing of Mark Bowden's best-selling books, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* and *Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw*.¹

Atkinson's vitae is even more impressive. He received Pulitzer Prizes for both history and journalism and is the author of the best-selling books *Long Gray Line: The American Journey of West Point's Class of 1966*; *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War*; and *An Army at Dawn: The War in Africa, 1942-1943, Volume One of the Liberation*.²

Both men have an understanding of things military that is unusual for journalists, and both know how to capture in print the drama and tragedy of modern war. That both decided to write books about the U.S. Army's experience in the Iraq War should arouse our attention, especially because both have written books that transcend the limitations of normal "instant" histories.

The books are quite different, yet curiously complementary. Atkinson's *In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat* is a first-person account of his experience with the 101st Airborne Division Command Group from the weeks leading up to the war to the campaign's successful conclusion.³ The book is a study of command and commanders at the division and corps levels. (I overheard a U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) student quip that the book should more properly be called "In the Company of Generals.")

Atkinson is a central character in his own book, and his impressions and analysis are offered in every chapter. By contrast, Zucchino's *Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture* offers a third-person narrative of combat from brigade level and below (stylistically, think of *Black Hawk Down* with tanks).⁴ Zucchino leaves himself out of the narrative and gives the bulk of his attention to the battles fought by battalion and company commanders of the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 3d Infantry Division (3ID).

There are other important differences as well. Zucchino passes no judgments on the pretext or outcome of the war. But, Atkinson plainly believes U.S. warriors were "better than the war they were fighting." He finds George W. Bush's Administration's stated reasons for going to war "in-

flated and perhaps fraudulent" and that U.S. postwar rhetoric in face of a growing insurgency ranged from "resolute to hallucinatory." While in Iraq, Atkinson kept such views to himself, according to members of the 101st Command Group.

Certainly, he was concerned with building a rapport with the key leaders of the unit he accompanied—Major General David Petraeus in particular. Petraeus is the central figure of Atkinson's book, and judging by the way Petraeus confided in him, Atkinson was successful in fostering a relationship of friendly respect with the general. (Another writer who accompanied the Marines into Iraq suggested in a recent *New York Times* interview that it was the job of the journalist to "charm and betray" his subjects.)⁵

Atkinson clearly admires Petraeus and found him to be extremely intense, competitive, and a "nuanced" thinker. Certainly, one sees Petraeus wearing many faces during the campaign. In one moment he will be offering a "hooah" pep talk to the division staff, the next moment he is confiding to Atkinson: "I think this thing may be overstretched." In the end, one wonders who was playing to the other the most.

Atkinson also had the opportunity to observe the corps commander, Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, at close range. Indeed, it is Atkinson's quote of Wallace's—"The enemy we're fighting is different than the one we wargamed against"—that lands the corps commander in hot water with his superiors. In Atkinson's description, the current Combined Arms Center commander comes across as candid, pragmatic, tactically sound, but lacking some of Petraeus's political savvy.⁶

Despite differences in approach and topic, the books intersect in three significant ways. One is Vietnam and

the shadow it still casts over the U.S. military. During the fighting for Najaf, Atkinson asks Petraeus what it will take to subdue Iraq. Petraeus's answer is a quote from an early Pentagon assessment of what it would take to defeat the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam: "Eight divisions and eight years." Petraeus was clearly worried the campaign could degenerate into a quagmire.

Colonel David Perkins, commander of the 3d ID's 2d BCT had similar worries. The campaign plan called for the 3d ID to set up outside Baghdad in support of probes made into the Iraqi capital by the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions. Perkins and his executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Eric Wesley, feared this time-consuming approach, which while doctrinally sound, could bog down and lead to a Vietnam-style stalemate. With this thought in mind, Perkins tested Iraqi defenses with a bold thrust into the heart of the city—doctrine be damned. Thus, according to Zucchini, memories of the war in Southeast Asia served to inspire the tactical ploy that was decisive in collapsing Saddam Hussein's regime.

Another place the books intersect is in the U.S. Army's efforts to destroy the Medina Division, which was the elite Iraqi Republican Guard unit that blocked V Corps' approach to Baghdad. The 101st Air Assault's air assets and the attack helicopters targeted the Medina Division for special attention. But the 101st's plan to attack was dramatically revised on 23 March.

In a battle Atkinson describes in some detail, a V Corps asset, the 11th Attack Aviation Regiment, was nearly shot to pieces because of a failed deep attack on the Medina Division. Suddenly, one of the most potent weapons in the 101st arsenal, the Apache helicopter, was unable to play its assigned role in accomplishing the mission.

On 28 March, the 101st launched its own attack helicopter strike on the Medina Division, but it was unable to find the rich target array that intelligence had promised. Perkins' brigade was left to roll up the Medina Division on the ground. According to Zucchini's narrative, 3d ID tankers fought an all-day battle to mop

up an enemy force that had not taken a fraction of the punishment estimated by the order of battle experts. Here, and at other points in both books, the reader is left to marvel at the gaps and flawed analysis in the U.S. tactical-intelligence picture. Atkinson writes, "[A]mbiguity, misperception, and ignorance . . . capered across the battlefield like mischievous elves."

Finally, the two books converge in a curious way at a tragic event—the death of Sergeant First Class John W. Marshall of 3-15 Infantry, who was killed while helping to lead a badly needed supply convoy in a desperate fight at Objective Curly. As part of his fast-paced battle narrative, Zucchini describes the circumstances in detail—how Marshall came to be at the head of the convoy manning a Mark-19 grenade launcher and how, in the heat of an Iraqi ambush, he was killed by a rocket-propelled grenade strike.

Atkinson treats Marshall's death quite differently. He opens his book with the story of how Marshall's body was found in a shallow grave by soldiers from the 101st, days after the battle at Objective Curly. Atkinson uses the incident to introduce his doubts about the war, a theme he returned to again and again: "In a political democracy, every soldier's death is a public event. Every soldier's death ought to provoke the hard question: Why did he die?"

So, *Thunder Run* and *In the Company of Soldiers* are two quite different books that, nevertheless, overlap in important ways. Together, Atkinson and Zucchini complement each other in their descriptions of the war in Iraq. One describes combat at the brigade level and below; the other considers command at division level and higher.

Both are important to understanding the recent campaign in Iraq.

In the brief euphoria that followed the fall of Hussein's statue in downtown Baghdad, the military congratulated itself on finally overcoming the mutual distrust that had existed between the uniformed services and the media since Vietnam. Over the last year, the honeymoon has lost some of its romance. The failure to find weapons of mass destruction, the growing death toll, and the Abu Ghraib Prison fiasco have pitted the press against the military once again. But, whatever the relationship, Zucchini and Atkinson show us that journalists can be an important resource in understanding how America fights its wars. I highly recommend both books, and were I the Dean of Academics at CGSC, I would find a way to work both into the college's curriculum. **MR**

NOTES

1. Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War* (New York: Penguin Books, 2000); *Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw* (New York: Penguin Books, 2002).
2. Rick Atkinson, *The Long Gray Line: The American Journey of West Point's Class of 1966* (West Lafayette, IN: Owl Books, 1999); *Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War* (Boston, MA: Mariner Books, reprinted in 1994); *An Army at Dawn: The War in Africa, 1942-1943, Volume One of the Liberation* (West Lafayette, IN: Owl Books, 2d ed., 2003).
3. Atkinson, *In the Company of Soldiers: A Chronicle of Combat* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2004).
4. David Zucchini, *Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2004).
5. Evan Wright, *Generation Kill: Devil Dogs, Iceman, Captain America, and the New Face of American War* (New York: Putnam Adult Press, 2004).
6. MG David Petraeus will need every bit of his political savvy in his new mission of training and organizing the Iraqi armed forces, which might be one of the most difficult assignments given a U.S. officer since World War II.

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American Soldier

Colonel Gregory Fontenot, U.S. Army, Retired

The military autobiography is an old, well-established genre dating back as far as Julius Caesar, who set the standard. Some writers have met the challenge, including Union General Ulysses S. Grant, whose autobiography, *Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant*, avoided the turgid, self-serving prose that characterized virtually all autobiographies of his era.¹ British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's, *My Early Life: A Roving Commission* is brilliant.² Churchill also deserves high marks for his biography of the Duke of Marlborough, *Marlborough: His Life and Times, Book One*.³ General Dwight D. Eisenhower's writings, *At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends* and *Crusade in Europe*, are also well done.⁴

But, there are far more poorly written biographies and autobiographies by generals than there are good ones. Confederate General James Longstreet and Union General William Tecumseh Sherman were interesting men who played important roles during an interesting time; however, they produced ponderous, nearly unreadable accounts of their experiences. Neither showed the least bit of talent in making his own life interesting. After Operation Desert Storm many military autobiographies emerged. Nearly all, well written or not, have contributed to the understanding of the operation.

U.S. Generals Norman Schwarzkopf, Colin Powell, William G. Pagonis, Frederick Franks, Charles A. Horner, Anthony Zinni, Rogue M. Steiner, and Wesley K. Clark have published memoirs in the last decade. Foreign officers have also published accounts of experiences in the Falklands, Iraq, and the Balkans. The Iraq War will most likely produce another bevy of memoirs.

Not surprisingly, U.S. General Tommy Franks' autobiography, *American Soldier*, was "on the street" quickly.⁵ Franks who retired soon after a major combat operation ended (many of his colleagues remain on active duty), had a lucrative contract and a guaranteed best seller before he wrote his first word. In short, he had ample motivation.

American Soldier, a great story, is straightforward in ways most autobiographies are not. The book's first

half is evocative of soldiering and Vietnam, with Franks sharing much about himself, how he thinks, and what his strengths and weaknesses are. He is the genuine article, rising high from humble beginnings—the American Dream fulfilled.

When Franks received orders for Vietnam, his father, a hard-working, determined man of principle, advised him to make a hand; that is, to carry his share of the load. Franks made a hand, and *American Soldier* tells in a captivating, lucid, compelling voice, how he learned the art of soldiering, survived combat, and grew as a soldier.

The book's second half is as honest, captivating, illuminating, and direct as the first. Franks leaves no doubt about his feelings for service chiefs, making it clear they were *not* in the chain of command and should stay out of combatant commanders' business. Franks gave short shrift to virtually any recommendation or criticism he received from the chiefs, characterizing their input for operations in Afghanistan as "parochial bullshit."

While service chiefs were often inclined to take parochial views, Frank's anger toward them seems out of proportion to the interference for which he claims they were responsible. He also found some senior Department of Defense executives unhelpful; in particular, Undersecretary Doug Feith, who was not held in high esteem at Central Command (CENTCOM).

Franks' description of operations planning is a primer on how to develop combat operations in a complex political-military realm of joint and combined operations. His personal effort in forming a joint and combined team in CENTCOM is a model on how to get the job done. Franks says executing combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq could effectively be accomplished by small ground forces and, creatively along with precise applications of air power, by using special operations forces.

Franks is less convincing when describing Iraq's and Afghanistan's intended strategic end states beyond that of unseating Saddam Hussein in Baghdad and the Taliban in Kabul. Obviously, the direction for the stra-

tegic ends must come from above, but Franks is not clear what role, if any, CENTCOM should play in the direction for the strategic end beyond executing combat operations—leaving the impression that postwar problems belong to someone else.

This view is unconvincing given the Army's historical experiences in Europe and Japan after World War II. Some transition and postconflict planning must reside with the warfighter. Given Frank's strongly held convictions about force size and composition requirements in Afghanistan and Iraq, surely he had equally firm convictions about how the campaign's war termination phase should proceed. His argument about the efficacy of the new way of war, which he contends occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq, cannot be considered solely from the vantage point of knocking off Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. The transition and conditions at the end of each campaign is not entirely unrelated to the commander's concept.

American Soldier is an important addition to the genre of military autobiography and to the public record on Afghanistan and Iraq. Like other books published quickly after those campaigns, the book is not likely to be the last word on the campaigns or even on Franks' leadership. Franks did indeed make a hand—as a soldier and as a soldier-author. Hopefully, in the coming years he will elaborate on the endgame in both campaigns. **MR**

NOTES

1. Ulysses S. Grant, *Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant* (Old Saybrook, CT: William S. Konecky Associates, 1999).

2. Winston Churchill, *My Early Life: A Roving Commission* (New York: Scribner, 1968).

3. Churchill, *Marlborough: His Life and Times, Book One* (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1955).

4. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *At Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1967); *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1948).

5. Tommy Franks with Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier* (New York: Harper Collins, 2004).

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Syrian Defense Minister General Mustafa Tlas: Memoirs, Volume Two

Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

Syria has played a significant role in the events that have occurred in Iraq. Syria's borders offered a means of escape for many Iraqi Ba'athists, possibly including Sadija, Saddam Hussein's wife. U.S. forces have pursued Saddam loyalists into Syria, and Syrian leaders have been warned not to destabilize coalition efforts in Iraq. Syria also supports the Lebanese terrorist group Hizbullah and other Palestinian militant rejectionist groups. The UN has called on Syria to withdraw its forces from Lebanon, which has been under Syrian domination for three decades.

Syria, an enigmatic nation, was once ruled by the shrewd dictator, the late Hafiz Al-Asad. Former Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas and Al-Asad had a lifelong relationship and together rose through the ranks of the divisive politics of Syria's military establishment.

Syria's role in the Arab-Israeli wars was enigmatic, and Syria's scholars and military leaders have yet to research it fully. Few Syrians have written about their experiences, partly because of Syria's highly compartmentalized society. Only after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's death did Egypt begin publishing books on the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom-Kippur War. Syrian books on the Arab-Israeli conflict are not as prevalent as are Egyptian books. Dozens of volumes that explore many angles of the 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, from economics to military tactics, have been published in Cairo.

Not only has Tlas written books about Syria's military and political history, he has also written books of poetry, general Arab history, and a history of the military tactics of the Prophet Muhammad. His writings reflect a rabid anti-Semitism and belief in conspiracy theories, but this should not stop U.S. military planners from learning what shapes his mind. Tlas's two-volume memoirs, *Mirat Hayati* (Reflections of my life), describes his experiences from 1948

to 1967, with commentary on a range of subjects that shaped his political and military philosophy.¹ Tlas's is a unique memoir that offers a rare glimpse into Syrian political-military thinking and the personal views of an extremely powerful figure within the Syrian regime.

Tlas was born in 1932 in a small village near Homs. French General Charles DeGaulle visited Tlas's village in 1943, where DeGaulle spoke to Syria as an ally, not as a protectorate, greatly influencing Tlas. Tlas added DeGaulle's books to his required reading list and studied DeGaulle's military campaigns and political rise to the presidency.

Israel's formation as a state in May 1948 and the defeat of the seven Arab armies also affected Tlas's views. Many revisionist writers blame the Arab's defeat on leaders who were more concerned with other landgrabbing leaders, or leaders who adopted the Palestinian cause to divert popular opinion, than they were with winning the war. Tlas believed the old Arab nationalist theory that the United States, France, Britain, and the Soviet Union conspired to create Israel. When Tlas describes the first Arab-Israeli War, he fails to consider Israel's infant defense force's resourcefulness or its tactical ability on the field.

The combined Arab forces' debacle in the first Arab war reverberated within Arab capitals. Colonel Husni Zaim used the momentum of discontent to lead a successful coup d'état in 1949—the first time an Arab military strongman had overthrown a government in the Middle East. This ushered in a series of military takeovers and the permanent intervention of the military in the political life of many Arab nations.

During a second coup in 1949, Colonel Sami Al-Hinnawi came into power amid more violence involving the purging of Zaim and his inner circle. Tlas's goal had been to become a literature teacher but took a position in Syria's military academy

in 1950. His emphasis on education never left him, and he insisted on developing a learned armed force.

At the academy, Tlas was influenced by Lieutenant Colonel Mufleh Ali, who taught that the Palestinian War was a psychological one. He predicted this alone would topple Middle East governments. (Egypt, Iraq, and Libya had all experienced military coups that removed their monarchies.) Mufleh advocated a ceaseless campaign against Israel to be conducted by vanguard groups within Israel and on its borders. He instilled in Tlas the need to pursue other avenues of state power, such as waging a diplomatic war of attrition by bringing the Soviet Union and other great powers to an appreciation of the Arab view of the Palestinian situation.

Tlas studied French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte's military campaigns, focusing on Napoleon's use of favorable terrain to equalize the odds of winning wars. He also studied Akram Deery's translations of Napoleon's infantry tactics and memorized the parts that dealt with mobility and logistics.

In 1951, the Ba'ath Party and the Arab Socialist Party merged. During this time, Ba'ath party founders, Michel Aflaq and Syria's Foreign Minister Salah-al-Din Al-Bitaar's roles were defined within the new Syrian government. Aflaq became the ideologue and Al-Bitaar assumed the day-to-day functions of the Ba'ath Party. This facade of union was critical to Tlas, because the Syrian armed forces contained pockets of political officers (Communists, Nasserists, Nationalists, Rejectionists, and Ba'athists).

Flight Training for Tlas

Tlas and Al-Asad were assigned to the newly established air force academy in Aleppo. Cadets were trained on single-propeller De Havilland trainers with a cadet-to-instructor ratio of 6 to 1. The school had eight aircraft: six for training and

two for maintenance studies and spare parts. During one mock engagement, Tlas failed to conduct proper air maneuvers and was told he could not continue his air training. He told the senior air instructors his dream was to become chief of the general staff and that some day he would move divisions and brigades across the field of battle. Because the only subject Tlas excelled in was aerial navigation, his instructors suggested he enroll in the tank corps. The dismissal did not embitter Tlas; rather, he left with an appreciation for air dominance in planning ground attacks. He became one of only a few Arab officers who could communicate air coordinates to support ground units.

Many military theorists influenced Tlas's tactical thinking, including—

- German Field Marshals Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian, who shifted the center of ground tactics to the tank and formulated the plans for the massive air and tank assault that overwhelmed French forces in 1940.

- German General Erwin Rommel, whose desert campaign strategies led Tlas to consider Rommel's material as vital reading for ground infantrymen.

- Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz, whose introduction to *On War* was published in French military magazines.²

- Russian Field Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who planned and executed the defeat of Nazi forces in the Soviet Union and whose commentaries were Tlas's first introduction to Soviet doctrine.

- DeGaulle, whose use of the French resistance within Vichy France to undermine Nazi power and augment allied efforts provided examples to Tlas for Arab resistance movements within Israel.

- U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, whose ability to maintain coalitions during World War II taught Tlas the importance of coalition-building, which he used to build the Syrian-Egyptian union in 1958 and during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.

Tank command instructor Captain Abdul-Ghani Al-Dahman became Tlas's mentor. Al-Dahman taught Tlas tactical armored theory, military strategy, and combined tactics (armor, infantry, artillery, and airborne

assaults in a concentrated effort in the field), using examples from World War II film footage and readings about Nazi campaigns in Poland and France. He also focused on urban tank battles between the Soviet Union and invading Nazi forces.

Al-Dahman had a passion for studying warfare, specifically defensive maneuvers, concentration of fire, and visual and radio communications between tank formations. His students practiced in trucks mounted with 7.5- and 8-millimeter (mm) Hotchkiss machineguns. Al-Dahman was also instrumental in moving the tank school from Homs to Damascus, providing Tlas his first encounter with an actual tank—a surplus World War II Sherman. In 1954, Tlas was engaged in summer maneuvers and was totally immersed in learning his craft. His training included staff rides to the Golan and Israeli borders to study the 1948 Arab battles and to mark the sites of martyrs who had fallen during the first Arab-Israeli War.

Mine Training

In 1955, Tlas studied the types of mines he might encounter in the field and took courses in waterborne mines (antiship and antisubmarine variants). Rommel was Tlas's main source of inspiration for mine deployment in a mechanized infantry environment. Tlas's chapter, "Panzer Tanks," illustrates his appreciation for German mechanized infantry tactics. One of his basic courses included mine identification, breaching, and bridge construction.

Tlas witnessed the ascendancy of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and blamed Nasser's death on Israeli intelligence. He pieces together a fantastic conspiracy theory that involves the herbalist doctor, Ali Al-Atfi, who Tlas alleges poisoned Nasser. In reality, Nasser had been battling diabetes and heart disease for many years before succumbing to a heart attack; doctors had long been urging him to lighten his schedule and reduce his public appearances.

In late 1955, Tlas was commissioned a junior lieutenant in the 25th Armored Brigade in Qatana (a town between Damascus and the strategic Golan Heights city of Kuneitra). He met brigade commander Major Toumah al-Awadallah, a dominant

figure in Tlas's military career who inspired him to study the Israeli Golani brigade. Al-Awadallah was harsh with Tlas and, as a member of a political faction opposing Ba'athists, reassigned Tlas to the Syrian-Turkish front during hostilities between the two nations in 1957. Al-Awadallah recognized Tlas's talent as an instructor and assigned him to translate French manuals on tank operations and the 75-mm gun—knowledge that was then imparted to noncommissioned (NCO) officers and troops.

The Baghdad Pact

Tlas commented on what he considered the "evils" of the Baghdad Pact, which united Great Britain with Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey to contain the Soviet Union. He believes Britain and the United States are on a crusade to undermine Arab nationalist aspirations and that a united Arab front could counter superpower influence and destroy Israel. Tlas's hostility toward Israel has not lessened his keen interest in its deterrence strategy, which began in 1955, the year border hostilities between Israel and Syria increased after Damascus signed a mutual defense treaty with Cairo. Tlas's perspective of Israel is typically one-sided, with Israel consistently playing the role of aggressor. He does not mention the guerrilla attacks launched from Syria against Israel, only Israel's commando raids, specifically those launched from the sea.

On 6 March 1956, Syrian President Shukry Al-Quawaty, King Saud bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia, and Nasser met in Cairo. After a week, they announced 11 points on which the 3 governments agreed to mutually support one another. Tlas outlines five of the points that are of military interest:

1. A comprehensive plan to coordinate and ensure the sovereignty of any Arab nation under threat.
2. A comprehensive defense plan to confront any external hostilities on any Arab nation.
3. The development of a plan to undermine nations who provide Israel's armed forces with recruits and volunteers for its defense.
4. The development of a plan to confront the threat posed by the Baghdad Pact to pressure Arab

governments into an alliance with the West.

5. A plan to support Jordan against external pressures.

The agreement followed a massive Czechoslovakian arms deal that doctrinally changed the Syrian military. Tlas describes large amounts of military hardware, including the T-34 tank, being offloaded at the Syrian port of Latakia. The 25th Armored Brigade received new equipment and a new unit commander—Al-Dahman—Tlas's old instructor from tank school. Al-Dahman was probably selected to command because of his experience in teaching tank tactics and to help absorb the Soviet equipment into the Syrian army.

Nasser asked Jordan's King Hussein to dismiss General John Glubb, the head of Jordan's Arab Legion, and who Nasser felt was a Western agent. Glubb's removal was not easy because Glubb had brought expertise; a bevy of British military and technical officers; and £25-million grant to be used entirely to sustain Jordan's armed forces. To persuade Hussein to discharge Glubb, the Jordanian Arab Legion, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria pledged funds to compensate for the lost British aid. Syria sent Jordan a brigade and \$8 million in military aid.

Political discord within the Syrian army, which was headed by General Shawkat Shukair, led violent Ba'athist party elements to attempt to assassinate Arab Socialist leader Colonel Adnan Maki. Tlas implies this division over political affiliation was an Achilles' heel for Syria during the time Turkish troops massed on the Syrian border in 1957 and during the union with Egypt between 1958 and 1961.

Tlas describes many conspiracy theories, including the 1956 covert plan to overthrow Syria concocted by Iraqi Chief of Staff General Dagestani, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, and members of the British intelligence. The plan called for sowing civil unrest within Syrian political factions, executing police actions to restore order, and instituting a government favorable to the Baghdad Pact. Tlas believed the plan was to secure Israel's northern border before Israel, France, and England attacked Egypt during the 1956 Suez Crisis. Tlas did not back his asser-

tions with any documentation or scholarly research, however. He also includes a theory of U.S. CIA involvement with the Islamic Brotherhood in 1954 in an attempt to assassinate Nasser.

The 1956 Suez crisis. In response to Nasser's destabilizing influence in the region (such as threats to Israel and the nationalization of the Suez Canal), France, England, and Israel participated in Operation Musketeer to regain control of the Suez Canal and, possibly, stimulate the removal of Nasser from power. The main military theater was around the Suez Canal and the Sinai. Because of the mutual defense pact between Cairo and Damascus, Syria participated in several incidents. Tlas's unit was sent to the Golan, where some minor engagements occurred.

Tlas describes a heated exchange between Zhukov and Foreign Minister Nikolai Bulganin in persuading the Soviets to publicly side with Egypt. The Suez Crisis signified the end of the colonial powers of France and England and the rise of the United States and the Soviet Union as superpowers. Eisenhower and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev successfully negotiated the disengagement of Anglo-French and Israeli forces from Egypt.

Tlas recognized that Egypt and the Arab world scored a political victory in this conflict, although not a military one. If the region was to triumph over Israel, it would need to win at least one military war against Israel. Tlas, as head of Syria's Army, used his observations of the 1956 Suez Crisis to help plan the 1973 Yom-Kippur War.

The Syrian-Turkish quasi-war. Syria was openly hostile to the Baghdad Pact and accused Turkey of massing troops on its border to execute a U.S.-backed invasion. The Soviet Union supported Syria's charges, and Cold War tensions ensued, beginning with UN involvement and ending with Turkish and Syrian forces on the brink of hostility. Al-Awadallah, hoping to rid the army of Ba'athist influence, sent many Ba'athist officers, including Tlas, to the Turkish front. Tlas went from being an instructor at Syria's tank school to commanding several tanks and facing Turkish troops.

Union with Egypt, 1958. Syria's military and political leaders met weekly in early 1957 to discuss unification with Egypt to deter Syria's neighbors from meddling in Syria's internal affairs and to save it from internal divisions. The short-lived union eventually became the United Arab Republic.

Al-Bitaar, who met with Nasser in December 1957 to discuss the possibility of forming such a union was surprised to see Syria Army Chief General Afif Al-Burza there, even though both men had been part of the weekly deliberations. (It is important to note that these deliberations took place without Syrian President Al-Quwatly or Defense Minister Khalid Al-Azm's knowledge.) Al-Bitaar swallowed his surprise and joined Al-Burza in outlining Syria's internal strife and highlighting how communists, led by Khalid Bikdash, had controlled neighborhoods in Damascus and turned the Kurdish minority against the central government.

Al-Bitaar and Al-Burza complained that Iraq and Turkey, as members of the Baghdad Pact, had sent arms to Syrian rejectionists and had engaged (with U.S. encouragement) in overt military threats on Syria. Syrian senior officers convinced Nasser that unifying with Egypt would bolster Arab nationalism and bind the Syrian public in national unity. They told Nasser it was the only way to rescue Syria from civil chaos, but Nasser remained reluctant to enter into a unification agreement.

When Al-Quwatly learned of the unification talks, he also learned that 14 senior officers, who represented the bulk of command authority for the Syrian armed forces, were involved. Al-Quwatly feared a coup attempt and announced publicly his desire to unify with Egypt, which further pressured Nasser to agree to Al-Burza and Al-Bitaar's demands.

Nasser accepted unification with Syria (subject to a popular referendum between the peoples of Syria and Egypt) but mandated that all political parties in Syria be abolished and Syria's military divorce itself from politics. Al-Bitaar agreed to give up Ba'athist party politics to save Syria from civil strife. The decision did not come easy, however, as he was a cofounder of Ba'athism.

The two countries discussed the type of union they should become—a federal union like the United States, with two states under a single federal seat of government, or something other? On 22 February 1958, Syria and Egypt officially became the United Arab Republic (which disbanded in 1961).

Border skirmishes between Israeli settlers and Syrian farmers led to artillery exchanges between the two nations, with Syria's 1st Army challenging Israel's tanks. Tlas convinced his superiors of the need for a swift mechanized armor attack to challenge Israeli forces. Because of his bold recommendations to higher headquarters, Tlas was assigned to build up defensive units and reconnoiter the approaches to Tel Sheban. Tlas's unit set up kill boxes for Israeli armor and laid mines in the avenues opposing forces were most likely to use.

One of Tlas's most astonishing revelations is the planning of the 1958 Iraqi coup that brought down Iraq's monarchy. Iraqi Colonels Abdul-Kareem Qasem and Abdel-Salam Arif began planning a coup with their Syrian counterparts while stationed in Jordan. Al-Awadallah kept in contact with the Iraqi military officers while in Jordan without the knowledge of his commanding officer Colonel Suhail Ashi. Khalooq Ibrahim Zaki, an Iraqi student studying in Damascus, served as a conduit between Qasem and members of Syria's 2d Military Directorate (Intelligence).

Tlas's strategic discussions are peppered with events that happened in Iraq, including the 1958 deployment of U.S. Marines to Lebanon. Iraq's strongman, Qasem, was convinced Nasser was trying to assimilate Iraq into the United Arab Republic, a deal that would have led to purging the many officers who helped plan the 1958 coup and, in particular, the members of the Iraqi Ba'athist cells. In 1959, Nasser, with the help of Syrian Ba'athists, purged Syrian communist cells. Tlas believes this was a mistake as it further divided Syria's already politicized armed forces. In 1959, Syria made the decision to adopt Soviet military doctrine and Soviet-made weaponry.

Tlas spent part of 1959 on the Sinai front training Egyptian troops on the

operation and tactics of the T-34 Tank—part of Nasser's deliberate strategy to have Syrian Ba'athist officers assigned to Egypt. The Egyptians were trying to depoliticize and control Syria's army. Tlas and Al-Asad spent over a year in Egypt, learning hands-on lessons in practical land navigation.

During unification, Syria's air force graduated only 16 pilots. Before then the average had been 57 new pilots a year. The Egyptians used psychological examinations to disqualify Syrian candidates, giving choice command positions to Egyptian officers. Military and internal security apparatuses were under the exclusive purview of the Egyptians. All these things worked against Egypt and Syria's unification, and Syrian officers grew embittered.

The 1967 Six-Day War. The Israeli air force lightning strike that neutralized Syria, Egypt, and Jordan's air forces set the stage for ground operations in the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Tlas highlights key battles on the Syrian front and discusses the strategic implications of Israel's victory in the Six-Day War, which lasted from 5 to 11 June 1967.

Tlas, an armored brigade commander, assessed the war in terms of territory lost. Egypt, Syria, and Jordan lost 89,359 square kilometers. Tlas discusses Israel's new strategic depth and air force ability to conduct deeper tactical strikes from bases in the Sinai and the West Bank. Tlas was concerned with Israel's expanded radar capability and its early warning systems in the Sinai, Golan, and the West Bank.

The book ends with Tlas becoming the armed forces chief of staff and deputy defense minister in 1967. Patrick Seale's book, *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East*, the definitive biography of Al Asad, contains several references to Tlas's career that Tlas does not cover in his own memoirs.³ For example, Tlas scarcely mentions his role after the 1963 coup, in which he became a member of the military committee that governed Syria. Also missing is an account of the ad hoc tribunals he presided over after the Hama (Homs) rebellion of 1964 and the pivotal role he played in forcing Ba'athist founder Aflaq out of Syria, which increased Al-Asad's power. Tlas's

role in the 1967 war was more than just a tank brigade commander; he was the deputy defense minister and was instrumental in purging officers to help Al-Asad tighten his grip on the army. Tlas also does not discuss the use of Palestinian guerrillas in the order of battle against Israel.

A major criticism of Tlas's memoirs is that he does not tell the reader the order of battle of the Syrian armed forces either. Throughout the two volumes he mentions armored units, brigades, and regiments but never tells how many tanks or armored carriers were at each level of the organization. This is frustrating, particularly when he is describing Syrian battles with the Israelis in the Six-Day War.

Tlas's memoirs should have importance for American military planners because by his own admission, he views the United States as an enemy. America's interest in Tlas should be equivalent to its interest in Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap. As U.S. forces become more involved in the Middle East, it is vital the United States study such personalities as Tlas.⁴ **MR**

NOTES

1. Mustafa Tlas, *Mirat Hayati* (Reflections of my life) (Tlas's publishing firm, Dar Tlas, published the memoirs between 1991 and 1995.)

2. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

3. Patrick Seale, *Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

4. For more information about Syria, see Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Politics 1945-1958* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1986). Seale explains the prominent role of Syria's army in its political life. See also Moshe Ma'oz, *Asad: The Sphinx of Damascus* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), for a discussion of Hafiz Al-Asad's rise to power and how he maintained a hold on the Syrian military establishment.

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MR Book Reviews

CORPORATE WARRIORS: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, P.W. Singer, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2003, 242 pages, \$39.95.

According to P.W. Singer's *Corporate Warriors*, the U.S. Armed Forces have increased usage of private military firms tenfold between the first and second campaigns in Iraq. And, over the last decade, the United States has increasingly contracted out functions such as doctrine writing and military education functions. How should one think about these trends? Singer puts these issues into perspective by examining the private military firm industry as a whole. His pioneering work deserves a place on the reading lists of all U.S. military professionals.

The book looks at the privatization of military functions in historical perspective. Although private military companies are not new, their importance in warfare is greater now than at any time during the last two centuries. Such companies form a global industry, competing in an open global market, whose rise is related to supply and demand stemming from the end of the Cold War, the changing nature of warfare, and broader global trends toward privatization and outsourcing.

Singer also points out the limited value of characterizing private military firms as "good" or "bad" and introduces a useful typology that places the firms in one of three categories: military provider firms that orchestrate or apply force in combat operations; military consultant firms that provide advice or training; and military support firms that provide nonlethal services such as maintenance or infrastructure support.

The last section of the book focuses on implications and is of the greatest interest to U.S. defense professionals. Challenging the state's monopoly on the use of force, pri-

ivate military firms raise several issues of policy accountability and moral responsibility. Private military firms also affect the state's development of armed forces. According to Singer, "A pressing policy concern is the lax and haphazard way in which governments have privatized their own military services over the last decade."

While the logic behind this idea is business efficiency, cost savings are often not achieved because of the realities of limited competition and the lack of skilled oversight. Even more important, the long-term effects on the armed services might not be addressed. For example, will an army that increasingly contracts out its strategic planning and education continue to develop and retain strategic thinkers within its own ranks? Whatever private military firms might say, their bottom line is profit—not the public good.

Corporate Warriors is a groundbreaking exploration of a vital issue shaping the environment in which today's military operates; it is well worth the investment.

MAJ Suzanne C. Nielsen, Ph.D., USA, Camp Humphreys, Korea

PRAISE THE LORD AND PASS THE PENICILLIN: Memoir of a Combat Medic in the Pacific in World War II, Dean W. Andersen, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, NC, 2003, 236 pages, \$29.95.

In recent years, several books have been written about and by World War II medics: Richard H. Neal's *Army Medic, World War II 1943-1946: A Memoir* (Richard H. Neal, 2000); Leo Litwak's *The Medic: Life and Death in the Last Days of WWII* (Penguin Books, New York, 2002); Richard L. Sanner's *Combat Medic Memoirs: Personal World War II Writings and Pictures* (Rennas Productions, Saskatchewan, 1995); and *Healers in World War II: An Oral History of the American*

Medical Corps (McFarland & Company, Jefferson, NC, 2001) edited by Patricia W. Sewell.

The first three books portray each man's story and experiences in the European Theater. None provide a big-picture history, but from a smaller viewpoint, they give the reader a sense of the challenges World War II medics faced. Dean Andersen's *Praise the Lord and Pass the Penicillin*, which takes place in the South Pacific, adds to this list of memoirs.

The book is an anthology of 93 letters Andersen wrote to his parents and future wife during his combat tour. His letters describe fungal infections, malaria, poor sanitation, and hardships soldiers faced as they landed on beaches and evacuated wounded soldiers through jungles and snake-infested swamps. Andersen describes the "truth" of combat when he writes that his "first battle left [him] with many new feelings. [He] was so frightened that it made [him] sick."

For those interested in military medical history, this is an insightful, authoritative book. The book is easy to read and includes many never-before-published photographs and a few crude maps that support his story and engage the reader. Until other books are written about the life of medics in the South Pacific, *Praise the Lord and Pass the Penicillin* will remain the standard-bearer.

COL Robert S. Driscoll, USA, North Atlantic Regional Medical Command, Washington, D.C.

ULYSSES S. GRANT: The Unlikely Hero, Michael Korda, Harper-Collins Publishers, Inc., New York, 2004, 176 pages, \$19.95.

Ulysses S. Grant: The Unlikely Hero, the first of several books published by HarperCollins and Atlas Books in the Eminent Lives Series, begins with the amusing anecdote of how Grant got his name. Because of

a disagreement between his parents on what to name him, he was not named until 6 weeks after his birth on 27 April 1822. His parents compromised on the name Hiram Ulysses Grant. Because Grant detested working in his father's tannery, his father eventually obtained an appointment for him to West Point. On Grant's entry to West Point his name was inadvertently listed as Ulysses S. Grant, and Grant left it that way because his original initials spelled HUG.

At West Point, Grant ranked 21 in a class of 39, excelling only in horsemanship. His classmates included future Generals James Longstreet, William Rosecrans, Simon Bolivar Buckner, Richard Ewell, John Pope, and William Hardee.

Grant's baptism under fire came during the Mexican-American War at Palo Alto, Mexico, on 8 May 1846. The next day he took temporary command of his company at the Battle of Resaca de la Palma. Grant did not like war, but he discovered soldiers would follow his orders during combat. His subsequent courage and leadership was indicative of how he would command future events.

After the Mexican-American War, Grant married Julia Dent and was assigned to various posts throughout the nation. During this time he began drinking, causing suspicion of intoxication all through his life. Growing tired of military life and the sometimes-long absences from his family, Grant resigned his commission. He once again failed at everything he tried and went to work for his father clerking at the tannery store—a job he despised.

When the Civil War began Grant returned to the Army and received the rank of colonel. Although he did not excel in tactics at West Point, he knew an army had to take offensive action. He did not become overwhelmed by losses, sticking to his plan to cut off lines of communication (main supply route) and annihilate the enemy (a strategy and tactic employed in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm). Grant was elected president in 1868, serving two terms.

Ulysses S. Grant is a short, but ex-

tremely informative and absorbing book. It is a great historical and biographical reference.

**Paul L. Hulse,
Columbus, Georgia**

THE IRAQ WAR, Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr., Belknap Press, Cambridge, MA, 2003, 368 pages, \$25.95.

The Iraq War is not the book one would expect from Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, Jr., but it does have its strong points. Like Victor Hanson's *Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power* (Doubleday, New York, 2001), Murray and Scales emphasize that training and discipline are decisive factors in battle. Their succinct analysis of Iraq's history should be required reading, and the discussion of Ba'athism is crucial to understanding the instability and volatility of the region.

Murray and Scales assert that "for much of the world, victory and defeat is a simple calculation of who has boots on the ground at the end of the conflict." They do not examine what "boots on the ground" means in the Global War on Terrorism. They also do not explain how the Global War on Terrorism affects the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and the National Guard (ARNG). In general, they ignore the contributions of the USAR and ARNG, which is egregious; the Army cannot go to war without them. Murray and Scales also argue that the United States should recruit different leaders for the specialized units needed for the asymmetrical battlefield.

The Iraq War misses the communications revolution that occurred as V Corps went to off-the-shelf technology. V Corps' command and control structure was so robust Lieutenant General William Wallace could have fought from Heidelberg. The lesson here is if the Signal Corps is to stay relevant, it must improve its equipment and structure or the threat to put them out of business will come true.

Murray and Scales lack a firm grasp of the 11th Air Regiment's attack on the Medina Division in the

Karbala Gap and do not analyze why the attack was carried out in bad weather. Regimental Commander Colonel William Wolf is not mentioned, while the regiment's junior intelligence officer is. They give Wolf no credit for his brilliant maneuver of splitting his logistical tail into two elements.

The 3d Infantry Division was unable to arrive because the Fedayeen main supply route had attacked them while the other element, which went cross-country, arrived, enabling the successful initiation of the attack. While the book is worth reading, a more definitive treatment of the Iraq War might be forthcoming.

**LTC Robert G. Smith, USA,
Germantown, Maryland**

THE DAMBUSTERS, John Sweetman, David Coward, and Gary Johnstone, Time Warner Books, United Kingdom, 2003, 216 pages, \$24.95.

Against big odds, on the night of 16-17 May 1943, 19 Lancaster bombers from the secretly commissioned 617th Royal Air Force (RAF) Squadron left England to destroy several key dams in Germany. Hydroelectric dams—invincible to the inaccuracies of high-altitude bombing—powered the Reich's war machine. The dams' destruction required a harrowing nighttime, low-altitude, skip-bomb attack that was envisioned by an engineer and executed by a valiant aircrew. Although these airmen did not have night-vision systems such as used today, they were able to avoid flak by flying at treetop level for over 6 exhausting hours. With determination, bravery, and luck (only 11 bombers survived), they breached two dams and flooded the Rhine River Valley.

The Dambusters is a definitive, captivating account of one of World War II's most remarkable nighttime raids. The authors weave a fascinating, integrated tale from the conception of the "Upkeep" bomb to its eventual destructive detonation, and they detail the effect these backspinning bombs had on both sides of the English Channel.

The short narrative has universal appeal. Historians will appreciate the

book's straightforward account that corrects errors made in motion-picture depictions, and engineers will salivate at the synthesis of "stone-skipping"—a child's marble game that ultimately solved the breaching problem. Even aviation buffs will envy the challenge the bombers faced, biting their nails as each sortie builds to weapon release.

Dozens of supporting photographs make it difficult to put the book down. The authors' ability to weave the reenactment of the Lancaster AJ-N throughout the detailed account makes this book on par with Stephen E. Ambrose's *The Wild Blue: The Men and Boys Who Flew the B-24s Over Germany 1944-45* (Simon & Schuster, New York, 2002). *The Dambusters* is a worthy addition to any World War II connoisseur's library.

**MAJ Mark Ciero, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD SINCE 1815-2000, Jeremy Black, ed., Routledge, London, 2003, 224 pages, \$32.95.

The study of military history in the past half-century, and since the advent of "modernity," has focused on the great historical events in Europe and North America. Conflicts or wars elsewhere around the globe have been largely ignored, except in specialized studies. Noted historian Jeremy Black's collection of essays, *War in the Modern World Since 1815-2000*, redresses the situation. Written by scholars from diverse historical backgrounds, this collection of essays focuses on the differences and similarities of ways of war that have manifested themselves around the world over the past 200 years. What emerges from these essays is a useful and interesting study contrasting military developments of which many in the West are barely aware.

To say an evaluation of the European (or more traditional) methods of warfare are absent in the book, or even secondary, would be misleading; but of the nine essays, only one directly addresses European warfare. Two deal with naval and air power respectively, centering on develop-

ments in Europe and the United States during this time; another essayist considers the American military during the same period. The remaining essays examine the events of the past two centuries in China, South Asia, Japan, Latin America, and sub-Saharan Africa, where the specter of European colonialism is ever-present.

With one exception, the essays are thought-provoking, well-researched, and of the highest standards. Despite a variety of factors, which each author considers for the disparate trajectories of military events in each region, all provide vivid portrayals of the paths military forces can take in development. None of the regional areas studied had the same historical progress. In some, social factors were primary; in others, economic or cultural factors were important. They all reveal a vivid portrayal of warfare around the world that differs from the standard vision of Europe at war. The one essay that disappoints is on the American military; it is merely a chronological narrative that does not ask "why." Instead, it follows the basic "whats" of historical progression.

Black's anthology is refreshing. The breadth of historical analyses ensures students of military history will learn little-known facts. Considering the varied locations in which U.S. forces are currently deployed, it is wise to study this large base of professional historical information.

**LTC Michael A. Boden, USA,
Hohenfels, Germany**

PROTEST AND SURVIVE: Underground GI Newspapers During the Vietnam War, James Lewes, Praeger, Westport, CN, 2003, 256 pages, \$67.95.

"Something's happening here. What it ain't exactly clear," says Stephen Stills' 1966 song "For What It's Worth" (with apologies to protest songsters of the 1960s). This description largely applies to James Lewes' countercultural cri de coeur, *Protest and Survive*.

What Lewes actually wants to do is clear—rescue the so-called Vietnam-era "GI movement" from dismissal by the "establishment" of its day and by modern academic critics.

In Lewes' eyes, military leaders regarded GI dissenters as fringe malcontents, while scholars have, at worst, overlooked them entirely or, at best, consigned them to being exotic subspecies of the 1960s counterculture.

To reverse these judgments, Lewes argues that those behind underground military newspapers were the vanguard of the "plurality of GIs [who] not only opposed U.S. intervention in Southeast Asia" but were involved in an active, organized resistance movement.

The evidence Lewes offers for his thesis is thin and at times even contradictory. He relies on some especially turgid critical communications-theory scholarship, the self-serving reminiscences of various protest figures and "Gonzo" journalists, and the manifestos contained in 130 or so various underground GI newspapers archived in four university collections.

Although Lewes maintains that significant numbers of U.S. military personnel resisted the war, he has only his own wishful thinking to confirm this view. Indeed, at one point he flatly states, "It is impossible to accurately assess just how many GIs took part in anti-war activities." In recounting the saga of Roger Priest, an apprentice seaman assigned to the Pentagon in 1969, Lewes notes that Priest was the publisher, editor, and often sole contributor to his own "liberation newsletter"—hardly indicative of a mass movement.

Lewes perhaps anticipates such criticism, devoting a chapter to the military's "response and repression" that emphasizes the necessarily anonymous status of most uniformed dissidents. Unfortunately, this lands him in the predicament of propounding a nonfalsifiable theory. If the evidence for mass resistance does not exist, then it was either suppressed by "the brass" or the members of this supposedly seething underground were all cleverly hidden.

Undeterred by having failed to demonstrate his thesis, Lewes casually declares the GI papers "helped end U.S. intervention in South Vietnam." This hopelessly simplistic statement, unsupported by anything

preceding it, is almost certainly wrong. If anything, the causation is exactly opposite: "vietnamization," the war's winding down, and the elimination of the draft all contributed to the undoing of the antiwar movement.

Stylistically, this mercifully brief book reeks of dissertation padding. The book's entire first third consists of rehearsing theoretical frameworks, fatuous definitions, and methodological throat clearing. Throughout, the decidedly nonfelicitous prose is jargon-laden and heavy with repeated academic sign-posting; for example, "In this chapter, I first focus. . . ."; "I examine. . . ."; "I test. . . ." Lewes also has the distressing habit of adopting his protagonists' viewpoint and, somewhat anachronistically, even their vocabulary. Thus, he treats readers to approving quotations of infantile, frequently scatological, rants against "the pigs" and repeatedly refers to officers and noncommissioned officers as "lifers" and "the brass."

While the subject and tone of this book will be off-putting to many readers, there is nothing wrong in exploring the less edifying, dimly lit corners of military social history. Barracks lawyers, insubordination, desertions, drug use, "combat refusals," "fraggings," and mutinies are as old as Homer's *The Iliad* (Penguin Books, New York, 2003) and as up-to-date as Operation Iraqi Freedom. Soldiers of a certain age recall all too well these late-Vietnam and immediate-postwar pathologies.

The samizdat Lewes discusses perhaps has its analogue today in some of the websites and blogs disgruntled service members and ex-members run. Lewes's romantic renderings in *Protest and Survive*, however, do not advance understanding of any of this. That would require intelligent interrogation of the underground GI literature, as well as relevant secondary sources, oral histories, and the official record. Fascinating and valid questions remain. As Bob Dylan's song says, "The answer, my friend, is blowin' in the wind."

**COL Alan Cate, USA, Retired,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania**

FANATICS & FIRE-EATERS: Newspapers and the Coming of the Civil War, Lorman A. Ratner and Dwight L. Teeter, University of Illinois Press, Champaign, 2003, 232 pages, \$34.95.

Lorman A. Ratner and Dwight L. Teeter's book, *Fanatics & Fire-Eaters: Newspapers and the Coming of the Civil War*, is an interesting history of the press just before the Civil War began. The topic is interesting and timely, given recent interest in the objectivity of news media. The authors cite a broad range of newspapers, geographically and politically, from the radical fire-eating Charleston *Mercury* to Horace Greeley's New York *Tribune*, and others that were geographically and politically between these extremes. The authors also give an excellent detailed discussion of what they call the "democratic press" and the associated development of the telegraph service.

Ratner and Teeter's case studies are excellent examples of mid-19th-century media coverage: the caning of Senator Charles Sumner, the Dred Scott case, Bleeding Kansas, the attempted insurrection at Harper's Ferry, and Abraham Lincoln's election and the firing on Fort Sumter.

Unfortunately, the text contains many factual errors, ranging from the sloppy to the egregious. For example, the authors incorrectly state that John Brown was incarcerated in Richmond, misdate Confederate President Jefferson Davis's inauguration, and even get President George Washington's birthday wrong.

The authors assert that "four of the eight slave states remaining in the Union joined the Confederacy within 48 hours after the [12 April 1861] attack on Fort Sumter." In reality, Virginia seceded on 17 April; Arkansas and Tennessee on 6 May; and North Carolina not until 20 May. The authors also erroneously dismiss claims that "twenty towns burned in Texas" as being widely circulated but false rumors. In fact, arsonists did burn 20 Texas towns or portions thereof during the summer of 1860. The authors should know this: the stories were printed in Southern newspapers.

Finally, the tone of the book is sometimes condescending. The au-

thors describe Lincoln as the "sympathetic but determined father" dealing with Southern states described as "obstreperous and wayward children." These are the authors' words. Such emotion-laden and condescending verbiage has no place in a serious history.

When dealing with newspapers, Ratner and Teeter are at their best. The book suffers when they stray too far from that topic. This book is worth reading, but read it with caution.

**LTC D. Jonathan White, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

THE AMERICAN FOREIGN LEGION: Black Soldiers of the 93d in World War I, Frank E. Roberts, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2004, 259 pages, \$29.95.

Did the black soldiers of the 93d Division fight for America or for France? You can form your own opinion, but the 93d was one of the first, and arguably the best, fighting units in the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). The 93d's amazing story is well written by first-time author Frank E. Roberts, who takes the reader from the establishment and training of the division's regiments in 1917 to its deployment and combat in France to the "taps for the 93d" ceremony in 1919. Roberts covers each infantry regiment through each phase of its service, which makes the book easy to read. Maps and original photographs add to the reader's understanding; but unfortunately, Roberts does not identify enemy units, referring to them only as "the Germans."

Although Roberts takes each regiment from its conception to taps, his is by no means a dry historical account. Instead, it is an entertaining, informative story of men who "fought to fight." With the U.S. War Department's lack of confidence in forming and sending black troops into combat, it took significant political wrangling just to stand-up each regiment and, ultimately, the division.

Training was a big hurdle for black units, as they were often sent to train at Southern posts. Despite incidents with the local population; severe lack of training resources; and substandard transport to France, each regi-

ment eventually shipped off and became some of the first AEF units to experience combat. The soldiers fought well and distinguished themselves on French battlefields, earning several awards for valor, which is not surprising, as many of the soldiers were veterans of black units that had been deployed to various conflicts before World War I, including the Mexican Punitive Expedition of 1916.

There is no doubt the 93d fought *for* America and fought *with* the French, but once in France, each regiment was assigned to a different French division. Throughout the war these regiments fought as regiments within French divisions. Initially well equipped by AEF standards, having new uniforms and Springfield rifles, each regiment had to turn in its rifles, bayonets, and other U.S. field items in exchange for French-issued gear, which resulted in coalition warfare at the tactical level with an odd mixture of uniforms and equipment.

This book is entertaining, and its firsthand accounts run the gamut from humorous to sad and show the soldiers' perseverance, spirit and extraordinary courage. It is a story that makes you proud to be an American soldier.

**LTC Scott A. Porter, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**SUPPLY FOR TOMORROW
MUST NOT FAIL: The Civil War
of Captain Simon Perkins, Jr., a
Union Quartermaster**, Lenette S. Taylor, Kent State University Press, Ohio, 2004, 240 pages, \$35.00.

Every U.S. military officer has heard the stories, visited the battlefields, and read countless articles and books about the American Civil War. We normally focus our studies on the great campaigns, acts of heroism, and colorful leaders of that conflict. Unfortunately, we rarely consider the immense effort required to provision and support those enormous armies in the field. *Supply for Tomorrow Must Not Fail* will certainly help fill that gap. The book is a "must" for logistics officers as well as serious students of the American Civil War.

Captain Simon Perkins, Jr., a Union Quartermaster in the Western The-

ater, left behind a trove of records of his service during the Civil War. Lenette S. Taylor used Perkins' personal records and detailed research to write a book that clearly demonstrates the fantastic complexities of a logistics officer during the war. The book's level of detail is remarkable, and the author does an excellent job of keeping the specific experiences of Perkins in the proper context to the overall campaign.

The book's lessons provide quality insight for logisticians supporting the Global War on Terrorism. The transportation complexities of moving tens of thousands of soldiers through the rural south; the forage and food requirements for armies on the move; extremely difficult distribution of supplies; the protection of convoys and transportation assets from guerrilla bands and criminals; and the requirements for garrison quarters spread over immense distances bring to mind a common situation being experienced even today. This book clearly shows that none of the current U.S. military's logistical problems are unique.

The only shortcoming is that the reader can easily get lost in ledger numbers and the high level of detail. Fortunately, Taylor does an excellent job directing the reader to the overall context in which the accounts were written and frequently uses humor to maintain the book's pace.

This book is written for two audiences: today's military logisticians and the serious student of the American Civil War. Taylor's well-written book deserves a place on the professional bookshelf of every military logistician and civil war scholar.

**MAJ Jason Carrico, USA,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**SNAKE PILOT: Flying the Cobra
Attack Helicopter in Vietnam**, Randy R. Zahn, Brassey's, Dulles, VA, 2003, 283 pages, \$27.95.

Randy Zahn, being a good son, wrote his parents regularly and taped daily messages to them while serving a tour in Vietnam. His parents saved his tapes and letters, and 33 years later, Zahn reconstructed his year of combat in Vietnam with surprising detail, capturing the cocki-

ness, angst, and attitude of the native 19-year-old 1st Cavalry Division attack helicopter pilot of 1970 and 1971. Zahn, apparently a great pilot in the air, was a frequent pain for his chain of command when on the ground. Characteristically, he still carries some of the same attitudes and grudges.

From another valuable perspective, *Snake Pilot* discusses how the Cobra attack helicopter evolved from the UH-1B Iroquois (Huey), a helicopter designed for close air support and direct combat with enemy infantry fighting in the jungle. The UH-1B's descendants, the AH-64A Apache and AH-64B Apache Longbow, evolved to another purpose—destroying tanks while hovering 4 kilometers away.

As events in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrate, gun techniques and tactics of yesterday are again relevant, so it is time to revisit the standing operating procedures and lessons learned from the attack helicopter's early days of combat. Many of the air-ground coordination, intelligence dissemination, and supporting technology problems that occurred in Vietnam still bedevil the military. *Snake Pilot* is informative and easy to read, and I recommend it to those interested in Army aviation, the Vietnam War, and leadership of aviation units.

**LTC Lester W. Grau, USA, Retired,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE
WARS: A Short History of U.S.
Military Engagements: 1975-2000**, Peter Huchthausen, Viking, New York, 2003, 272 pages, \$25.95.

Peter Huchthausen's *America's Splendid Little Wars* is a small survey of major U.S. military interventions from 1975 to 2000 through five presidential administrations, beginning with Gerald Ford and ending with Bill Clinton. The book includes 13 "little wars," from the 1975 operation to recover the high-jacked merchant ship SS *Mayaguez* in the Gulf of Siam to the 1999 "relief intervention" in Kosovo. Huchthausen demonstrates how each administration used military force in its relations with other nations.

In each case, Huchthausen discusses the events that culminated in the use of force and describes the nature of the military action, the key figures involved, and provides an assessment of each outcome. His sound geopolitical and political-military analyses place each conflict in proper historical perspective and explain the underlying motivation for each military intervention.

Huchthausen, a retired naval officer and former intelligence analyst, points out that recent "small" U.S. military actions have been a decidedly mixed bag, with a number of them clearly in the "win" column. Several, like the Iranian hostage rescue, peacekeeping in Beirut, and the humanitarian intervention in Somalia, are in the "loss" category. Huchthausen describes how inter-service rivalries; difficulties in understanding the local political situations; the leadership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders; and the effect of political policy formulation affected the outcome of each conflict.

Huchthausen is aware of the dangers of "employing civilian management techniques" in military operations, as tragically demonstrated in the failed rescue attempt of American hostages in Iran in 1980. He lauds the positive effects of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols reforms that caused an improvement in inter-service cooperation and improved operational performance, as shown in the 1989 invasion in Panama.

Huchthausen does not provide an exhaustive discussion about whether military action should have been used in each instance; this is not what he set out to do. His intention was to discuss how the military instrument of power was used once the political authority had decided to wield force to achieve national interests and objectives. At the same time, he wanted to show the evolution of battlefield hardware, communications, and command and control technologies.

Huchthausen succeeds in his objective, admirably providing a compact overview of military intervention of the past 25 years that sticks to the facts. Reasonably well researched, *America's Splendid Little Wars* is concise and written in a clean, readable fashion. I recommend it for mili-

tary historians or anyone wanting to understand the evolution of U.S. military intervention during the last quarter of the 20th century.

**LTC James H. Willbanks, USA,
Retired, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**PATHS OF DEATH AND GLORY:
The Last Days of the Third Reich,**
Charles Whiting, Casemate, Haver-
town, PA, 2003, 210 pages, \$29.95.

Charles Whiting, a World War II historian and prolific author of dozens of books on the events of 1939-1945, views the final months of World War II through a diverse groups' experiences and perspectives in his latest work, *Paths of Death and Glory: The Last Days of the Third Reich*. The book is accurate for the most part but lacks in detailed research or documentation and is filled with Whiting's personal opinions and biases, which unfortunately detract from the book's overall flow.

Whiting presents his material chronologically, with each chapter depicting a different month in the course of 1945. The book however, lacks a narrative standard. Whiting uses vignettes from assorted points of view, depicting various Allied and Axis viewpoints from the highest to the lowest ranks and from the perception of events through the eyes of civilians as well as military personnel. Readers familiar with the final months of the war will not have a problem understanding Whiting's scattered approach. Each story is interesting, with some including familiar tales.

Most readers will have heard of the generals in Whiting's discourse, but he also includes such individuals as Audie Murphy and Eddie Slovak. Unfortunately, Whiting does not tie these disparate vignettes into a complete whole. Although interesting, they remain mere retellings of stories, autonomous within the larger framework of the book. Whiting maintains consistency in his frequent opinions about Allied military leadership, most notably his criticism of U.S. General George S. Patton's actions, referring to him as that "drunken, gray-haired old man."

The seasoned reader will not discover anything new in these pages, but for those looking for light reading about the events of 1945 in Eu-

rope, this book will serve adequately.
**LTC Michael A. Boden, USA,
Hohenfels, Germany**

**REBEL REEFERS: The Organiza-
tion and Midshipmen of the Confed-
erate States Naval Academy,** James
Lee Conrad, Da Capo Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 2003, 214 pages, \$30.00.

Thousands of books have been written about the American Civil War with hundreds of those focusing on the Confederate Army. Relatively few books, however, have delved into the Confederate States Navy and its associated institutions as does James Lee Conrad's *Rebel Reefers: The Organization and Midshipmen of the Confederate States Naval Academy*. This book is the exception that explores the Confederate Naval Academy and the education of midshipmen for the Confederate States Navy. Conrad provides an insight into the daily lives of the student-sailors and the workings of their naval school through the use of well-considered primary and secondary sources. He opens a window into one of the lesser-known pages of military history.

On 21 April 1862, the Confederate Congress passed an act to establish a naval academy for midshipmen. The CSS *Patrick Henry*, the paddlewheel flagship of the Confederate James River squadron, was converted into a school ship to teach naval officers. For the remainder of the war, the ship served as a naval academy with midshipmen-in-training alternating between the *Patrick Henry* and the fleet. Some ask why the Confederacy bothered to establish a naval academy after the disastrous battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg sealed the fate of the Confederacy. One answer might be that the South never realized it was dying.

In the end, the academy trained and educated approximately 180 midshipmen and provided professional junior officer corps to a "brown water navy" of approximately 130 ships that ranged from tiny torpedo launches to ponderous ironclads. The midshipmen, who were closer to their cannons than they were to their schoolbooks, conducted themselves with honor and respect whether serving at sea, marching as an infantry to

reinforce threatened Richmond, protecting Confederate President Jefferson Davis's family, or guarding the gold of the Confederate Government in the waning days of the war.

Conrad writes in effortless prose and gives the reader a flavor for the times, the institution, and the midshipmen. He supplements his book with interesting appendices and a solid bibliography. The only disappointment with the book is its short text, which could have easily been integrated into a larger, more extensive tome about the history of the Confederate States Navy. I found myself wanting to know more. I strongly recommend this book to all students of naval history and also to those wanting to know more about the Confederate military.

Kevin D. Stringer, Ph.D., Zurich, Switzerland

YANK: The Army Weekly, Reporting the Greatest Generation, Barrett McGurn, Fulcrum Publishing, Golden, CO, 2004, 257 pages, \$18.95.

Somewhat disappointingly, this book is not a comprehensive history of the GI-published World War II magazine, *Yank*, nor is it a compilation of the best writing put out by its talented draftees. Rather, *Yank: The Army Weekly, Reporting the Greatest Generation*, could more fittingly be titled "The Life and Good Times (sometimes bad times) of Sergeant Barrett McGurn as a *Yank* correspondent," with occasional anecdotal forays touching on history.

Yet even without examples of actual *Yank* journalism or an index to places, personalities, and war stories, McGurn's reminiscences take the reader back to a military vastly removed from that of today and to memories of the era's compelling literary magazines, such as the *Saturday Evening Post*, *Colliers*, *Liberty*, and newspaper rotogravures. (These mass-circulation giants have long since been replaced by the "sound-bite lite" magazines peeking almost entirely at politicians, entertainers, and athletes.) Pleasingly, McGurn adds examples of *Yank's* soldier cartoons that have become icons of an era.

As a force of citizen soldiers mobilized to fight the Axis powers on six continents, the U.S. Army decided to

let a bunch of enlisted magazine writers roam globally from *Yank's* editorial offices on East 42d Street in New York City. McGurn says, "Our job was to chronicle the life of the 'grunts,' leaving strategy to the brass."

General George S. Patton did not like *Yank* any better than he liked Bill Mauldin's cartoons in *Stars and Stripes*, so McGurn is able to pull first-person examples from a packed storeroom of brass-baiting. Along the way, McGurn introduces such personalities as Master Sergeant Joe McCarthy, a former sportswriter plucked from the mule-drawn artillery to hold total sway over *Yank's* editorial content; cartoonist George Baker, creator of Sad Sack; and best-selling author Marion Hargrove.

After his discharge as a staff sergeant, McGurn went on to a distinguished career in foreign reporting in the State Department and as communications director for the Supreme Court.

George Ridge, J.D., Tucson, Arizona

Ridge is a former reporter for Stars and Stripes—Editor

AMERICA'S FIRST FROGMAN: The Draper Kauffman Story, Elizabeth Kauffman Bush, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2004, 221 pages, \$19.11.

America's First Frogman: The Draper Kauffman Story is a biography penned by Kauffman's sister Elizabeth Kauffman Bush, who draws on family documents to provide personal insight into one of the U.S. Navy's most fascinating and unlikely success stories. Truly an unsung hero of World War II, Kauffman, the father of the Navy SEALs and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) communities, displayed the grit, determination, and perseverance of those who proudly serve in his footsteps.

After failing to receive a commission to the U.S. Naval Academy in 1933 because of poor eyesight, Kauffman continued to serve against the Germans as a French army ambulance driver in 1939 and was briefly imprisoned by the Germans.

Later Kauffman was commissioned as a junior officer in the Royal

Navy Volunteer Reserve where he volunteered for Britain's most hazardous duty at the time—the newly formed bomb disposal squad. Because of his distinguished service and the in-depth knowledge he gained, Kauffman was extended a commission in the U.S. Naval Reserve in November 1941 to organize the Navy's first Bomb Disposal School.

Navy Bomb Disposal School graduates, organized into six-man Underwater Demolition Teams, played key roles in the amphibious assaults on Normandy, Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, and Kauffman commanded teams in the Marianas and Okinawa. His overall accomplishments as a junior reserve officer were remarkable, considering that three of the organizations he founded are still active today, including EOD, SEALs, and the Radiological Safety School.

I recommend the book for its personal accounts of how naval special warfare came into being and its ability to clear up previous misconceptions.

LCDR John Snell, USN, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

WITH UTMOST SPIRIT: Allied Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945, Barbara Brooks Tomblin, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2004, 578 pages, \$39.95.

In *With Utmost Spirit*, Barbara Brooks Tomblin, noted military historian and author, offers a detailed account of the Allied Naval forces' struggle in the Mediterranean during World War II. This is not a well-known subject and its study is long overdue.

Tomblin uses personal dairies, after-actions reports, and ships' histories to develop the history of the Mediterranean Theater. More than a narrative of events, the book describes invasions of North Africa, Sicily, Salerno, Anzio, and Southern France. *With Utmost Spirit* integrates personal triumphs and tragedies of individual sailors, soldiers, airman, and their leaders as they struggle to learn how to defeat the Axis forces. Allied leaders (especially Americans) considered the Mediterranean Theater a "sideshow" and a drain on resources for the big event—the

invasion of Normandy. The fighting men and women of the Mediterranean Theater never received the tribute they richly deserved for the war they fought. Tomblin's work finally pays this tribute.

With Utmost Spirit is an outstanding example of the complexities joint and coalition forces face when fighting a capable enemy. Tomblin states that the Allied victory was the result of the sailors', soldiers', and airmen's courage, determination, and skill and also the cooperative efforts of British and U.S. forces. These efforts resulted in the Allies' ability to plan, prepare, and execute five large-scale amphibious operations, beginning with the Torch landing in North Africa and ending with the final assault into Southern France. The skill and expertise needed to gain control of the Mediterranean Sea provided valuable combat experience for the troops needed to succeed and help other forces accomplish their missions in Normandy and the Pacific Theater.
MAJ Jeffrey L. LaFace, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

ENDKAMPF: Soldiers, Civilians, and the Death of the Third Reich, Stephen G. Fritz, The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, 2004, 382 pages, \$35.00.

In April 1945, the war in Europe was near its end. Allied commanders, however, feared German SS and other hardcore elements in the Nazi regime would not surrender but, instead, continue to tenaciously resist while retreating to the mountains of Bavaria and Austria—an alpine festung. How long these “were-wolves” might hold out was anyone's guess. Proof that such an effort was underway came in a steady stream of propaganda from German Minister Joseph Goebbels' promise of a fanatical last stand. More important, the ferocious defense in Franconia by the Wehrmacht, SS, Hitler Youth, and the Volkssturm was direct evidence that the Nazi will-to-resist had not been broken. Fears of the fabled mountain redoubt were complicated by the nearly impregnable position of German General Johannes Blaskowitz and German Governor of the Netherlands Arthur Seyss-Inquart in fortress Holland and by the fear of an additional Nazi last stand

in the rugged mountains of Norway.

Although the possibility of resistance occurring in all three areas was remote, U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower did not want to take a chance that might prolong the war: “I will thrust columns southeastward . . . in the Danube valley and prevent the establishment of a Nazi fortress in southern Germany.” The collapse theory adhered to by the Allies erroneously reassured them that Holland and Norway would not become serious military problems, but fortress Holland, which did not collapse, was finally neutralized through a series of secret negotiations with General Johannes Blaskowitz and Seyss-Inquart, both of whom feared that Adolf Hitler would discover their treachery and have them killed.

Stephen G. Fritz's *Endkampf* convincingly challenges the accepted view that after the Allies crossed the Rhine in March 1945 the German army rapidly disintegrated and the war quickly wound down. To the contrary, he argues, the resistance in Bavaria was intense, and American units suffered more casualties in April 1945 than they had previously. Large numbers of civilians and combatants needlessly lost their lives in this hopeless Nazi last-ditch effort.

In 1947, American soldiers were attacked, sometimes killed, and Army facilities sabotaged or attacked. Part of the resistance was caused by die-hard elements who stuck it out in frustration over the deteriorating economy and the large number of German women who were involved with American GIs.

Occupation authorities also had to deal with roaming gangs of displaced persons; Jews living in camps in which they previously had been prisoners; a rampant black market that undermined the legal economy; and jurisdictional problems that arose between the Army, the German police, and UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration officials. These problems were seriously exacerbated by a general shortage of foodstuffs and a thoroughly damaged infrastructure.

Reminiscent of the current situation in Iraq, occupation authorities, journalists, and visiting politicians often despaired of success in Germany, calling for more troops and

more trained civil affairs personnel. The Army and President Harry S. Truman's administration (repeatedly accused of poor planning) faced charges similar to those being hurled today at those responsible for the war in Iraq. Skepticism toward eventual success and predictions of disaster were brandished by the press and public alike. Germany's past, the devastation wrought by war, and the perception of a botched occupation led many to conclude that restoration of a democratic society was beyond reach.

Fritz has made a major contribution to the understanding of how the war in Europe actually came to an end. The book is well-grounded in both German and English primary-source material and contains much new information. By extension, Fritz forces the reader to analogically re-examine events happening now in Iraq, demonstrating that the situation is not without historical precedent. Some readers might be frustrated by the minute detail of the combat encounters, but all will likely agree that *Endkampf* is pleasurable to read and definitely informative. I highly recommend the book.

Hal Elliott Wert, Professor of History, Kansas City Art Institute, Missouri

THE BURMA ROAD: The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India Theater in World War II, Donovan Webster, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York, 2003, 370 pages, \$25.00.

The title of Donovan Webster's book, *The Burma Road: The Epic Story of the China-Burma-India [CBI] Theater in World War II*, might deceive some readers, because, while the book does discuss the struggle the Allies had reopening the Burma Road, much of the discussion on the subject is at the beginning and end of the book and does not give justice to the Burma Road's political ramifications on the strategic and operational decisions made during the Campaign. The book also describes the “epic story of the CBI Theater,” but, again, much of the discussion is sketchy and many key details are omitted.

The book's true focus is on the trials and tribulations of General Joe Stilwell. Webster uses Stilwell to tie

together numerous vignettes about events and personalities. Once this is understood, the reader will begin to appreciate Webster's efforts and enjoy his engaging writing style and organizational skills. Webster chose the vignettes wisely, including accounts of Orde Wingate and the Chindits, Merrill's Marauders, and Chennault's Flying Tigers.

The Burma Road, however, does not present enough new material to make it worthwhile for the expert, and the novice does not possess the background to pull together Webster's loose ends. For those in between, however, the book is extremely interesting, entertaining, and informative. The book will definitely spark an interest in readers to learn more.

**LTC Rick Baillergeon, USA,
Retired, Lansing, Kansas**

THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA, 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to an Alliance, Dieter Heinzig, M.E. Sharpe Publishers, London, 2003, 552 pages, \$99.95.

In January 1950, the U.S. Government announced a state of neutrality in the Chinese civil war being waged between the anticommunists under Chiang Kai-shek's nationalist (Kuomintang) government on the offshore island of Taiwan and the communist regime of Mao Tse-tung, who had been recently inaugurated in Beijing. The United States leaned

toward the opinion that, communist or not, Mao was likely to follow the path of Marshall Josip Broz Tito's Yugoslavia; that is, military and political independence from the Soviet Union ruled by Joseph Stalin. Then came the Korean War.

In October, when the North Koreans were falling back onto their border with China, Stalin beseeched Mao to intervene and save Stalin's disciples who had governed Pyongyang. On 26 November, Chinese communist forces unleashed a savage attack on U.S. and UN forces pursuing the North Koreans up to the Yalu River. U.S. President Harry S. Truman promptly concluded that the Beijing regime was "Russian and nothing else." Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall concurred that the Chinese communists "regarded the Russians as co-religionists." For all intents and purposes, this announced the end of reaching out to China against the Kremlin until Richard Nixon became president in 1969.

America's policy of neutrality, as of January 1950, was not misconceived. There were numerous points of mistrust between Beijing and Moscow, Marxist or not. The broad story is not new. Stalin, since the birth of Chinese communism in the 1920s, repetitively sacrificed their interests to Russian reasons of state. For example, he directed Mao and his troops to subordinate to the Kuomintang when Chiang was at odds with Stalin's opponents—Great Brit-

ain and Imperial Japan. Mao, who felt he was being fed to the lions, said within his own circle: "We are certainly not fighting for an emancipated China in order to turn the country over to Moscow." Mao's streak of "nationalism" was not lost on Stalin who dismissed the Chinese Communist Party in the mid-1940s as a collection of "bourgeois reformers."

Ironically, America's attempt to exploit these fears helped to temporarily mend the fissure. Stalin was worried that the Chinese communists, now triumphant on the mainland, might slide over to the United States. Mao was worried about abandonment from Moscow and a fear of renewed intervention by America in the Chinese civil war. Mao's option to act as Tito had leveraged unprecedented aid out of the Kremlin and a formal alliance in January 1950.

This whole story is not particularly new, having been told in numerous books about China, Russia, Stalin, and Mao. The story, however, has not been told with the detail and dispassion of Dieter Heinzig's *The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945-1950*. Readers illiterate in Russian and Chinese are at the mercy of historians to read and analyze primary sources for them, but with Heinzig's book they can be confident they are getting the complete account.

No history book can be definitive, especially when the history is about a country like China, which is still

Corrections

The "Notes" in the January-February 2005 issue, "Do We Need FA30? Creating an Information Warfare Branch" by Major George C.L. Brown, U.S. Army, should read: Note 5, delete the word Rohm; Note 6 should read: "DOD IO, 'Roadmap'"; and Note 8 should read: "Author's personal experience."

On page 59 of the March-April 2005 issue, "Iraq: Italian Lessons Learned" by Riccardo Cappelli, the word "wounded" was left out, the sentence should read: "The official casualties were 15 Italian wounded and 15 Sadrists killed in action, but the Iraqi death toll might have been as high as 150 or 200."

Also on page 59 one sentence says, "Instead, they preferred to magnetize a nucleus of Italians (who had become semi-trapped while conducting a sortie) and entice. . . ." In reality the Italians guarding the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) were semi-trapped in the CPA building (never outside of it), from where they conducted several armed sorties.

Note 8 should read: "For more information about the second battle of Nasiriyah, see . . . Lorenzo Cremonesi, 'Barbara Contini, governatrice di Dhi Qar, nel fortino: Possiamo trattare' [Barbara Contini, Governor of Dhi Qar, from the redoubt: we can

negotiate], *Corriere della Sera*, 17 May 2004."

The bio should read: "Riccardo Cappelli is a member of the University Centre of Strategic and International Studies and of the Forum on the Problems of Peace and War of Florence. He received a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Florence. He teaches air warfare strategy at the Italian Air War College and has written several publications on military and strategic matters. He writes regularly for *Rivista Marittima*, the official magazine of the Italian Navy."

keeping many documents on close hold, but Heinzig's exhaustive study of Russia and China is clearly authoritative and the best book on the subject. Despite its excessive price, I recommend the book—full reading ahead.

Michael Pearlman, Ph.D., Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

EDWARD A. WILD AND THE AFRICAN BRIGADE IN THE CIVIL WAR, Frances H. Casstevens, McFarland, Jefferson, NC, 2003, 325 pages, \$34.95.

In *Edward A. Wild and the African Brigade in the Civil War*, Frances H. Casstevens, who is passionately committed to the ideals of the Union and black equality, tells the story of how a man's depth of commitment leads to his downfall and how his strong convictions lead him to questionable tactics to achieve his ends.

Ned Wild, a Massachusetts abo-

litionist and Harvard man, joined a Massachusetts infantry unit early in the Civil War. He was wounded twice in 1862—his right hand at Seven Pines and the loss of his left arm at Boonsboro. While recuperating, Wild became involved in recruiting black troops for the Union Army. He was selected to command a brigade of Union forces at Fort Powhatan, the largest fight in the war in which the Union troops were composed entirely of U.S. Colored Troops.

Problems arose when Wild used tactics that many, including his superiors, thought were excessive. He executed a prisoner in North Carolina and offended Victorian sensibilities by taking noncombatant women as hostages. In Virginia, Wild's men allegedly killed noncombatant civilians, and Wild himself allowed former slaves to whip a former master because Wild believed the man had been a cruel slave owner. The latter incident led to Wild's relief and even-

tual court martial. Even though the court martial was overturned on a technicality, Wild's career as a military commander was all but over by July 1864. After the war, Wild served in the Georgia Freedman's Bureau. His heavy-handed treatment of Georgia civilians, which included torture, eventually cost Wild the support of senior Union officials.

Casstevens' book is well researched and profusely footnoted; however, his narrative needs editing for clarity to eliminate duplication. Despite these faults, the book is worth reading because it shows how the use of excessive means to achieve one's ends can squander legitimacy and ultimately undermine those ends. This lesson is worth keeping in mind as the U.S. military pursues stability and peace in Iraq.

LTC D. Jonathan White, USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

